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Cooperative behavior as well as other cultural rules and values are made explicit in orga-
nizational units that procure and provide a common service. The common service is pro-
cured by a club, which consists of a user-value function, a representation governance, and
a budget-allocation function. The common service is provided by a ¯rm, which consists of
a value-production function, an implementation governance, and a remuneration function.
They extend the concepts of the consumer and the producer in neoclassical theory. The
functions mentioned are determined by cooperative games.
A governance is represented by a structure of principal-agent relations. The representation
governance is a bottom-up hierarchy, empowered by the members of the club. The imple-
mentation governance is a top-down hierarchy, empowered by the governor of the ¯rm. The
optimal size of the club organization and the ¯rm organization in a competitive environment
is determined under certain conditions.
This description of a club and a ¯rm allows characterization of some cultural dimensions
in the society. For one such cultural dimension, viz. the degree of collectivism in society, the
impact on the optimal organization is shown.
Keywords: Governance, cooperation, hierarchy, club, ¯rm, institution, service economy,
values, culture, organization.
JEL-classi¯cation: C71, D23, D63, D7, H1, L22.1 Introduction
An organization is ruled by internal values. These constitute its culture and determine even-
tually the performance of the organization. To a large extent, however, these internal values
are determined by external values, i.e., the cultural values and the governance system of the
society in which the organization performs. These observations are also valid for the ruling
paradigm in economics, the general equilibrium model in neoclassical theory. The internal
values of consumers and producers is to maximize utility and pro¯ts, which is consistent
with and supported by the external market rules. These neoclassical models have given an
impressive description of the economy on the basis of basically one value concept, the max-
imalization of individual utility. This force explains, a.o., the internal pro¯t-maximalization
culture imposed on ¯rms under neoclassical governance of society. This correspondence be-
tween the internal values of all ¯rms and households with the external values in the society
constitutes the basis of general equilibrium theory. However, there are more cultural di-
mensions in society than the utility maximizing one. When these other cultural dimensions
are taken into account, the neoclassical concepts of a producer and a consumer have to be
expanded. The rules governing these agents have to be designed by more sophisticated tools.
Why is this relevant? Why would one want to incorporate other cultural values in gov-
ernance than the neoclassical values? The main reason is, of course, that such other values
exist in society and may even di®er over the various countries. The questions posed here
are (i) can tools be designed to describe these cultural dimensions in governance, and (ii)
if so, what kind of e®ects do these cultural dimensions have on the organizations' behavior
and on the economy's equilibrium concepts? Can cooperation be made compatible with a
competitive equilibrium concept?
For that purpose, the concepts of a ¯rm and a club are extended with an organization that
is based on internal cooperation and is endowed with an organizational control parameter.
This extension is explained by transaction costs and lies therefore at the base of institutional
economics. It also implies that the internal cooperative values may di®er from the competitive
values ruling the market organization. Again the question arises, why one would want to
incorporate other internal values in an organization than the external values existing in
society? Such a divergence may very well frustrate adherence to the cornerstone of global
economic order, the concept of a competitive general equilibrium. This great achievement
of neoclassical theory has to be incorporated into any new approach. Fortunately, however,
the introduction of a cooperative internal organization is shown to be compatible with an
external competitive organization if only the interface between the internal and the external
organization is well designed. The introduction of organizational capacity as a production
factor has, of course, consequences for concepts such as Pareto e±ciency, which are void of
organizational arguments. Finally, the e®ects of one other cultural dimension, individualism
vs. collectivism, on the ¯rm and on the club organization is shown.
1So the concept of a ¯rm is rede¯ned to include a description of a cooperative internal
organization. Coase (1937) presented the seminal paper introducing this cooperative nature
of the ¯rm. Coase observed that transaction costs are made by a ¯rm to buy labor services
on a market. When these services are demanded regularly on the external market, it may be
cheaper for the ¯rm to make these services available within the ¯rm by means of long term
contracts. The ¯rm, as an organization of positions connected by agency relations, writes long
term contracts for each position to be ¯lled. The ¯rm's organizational costs of writing and
monitoring one long term contract may at most be equal to the organizational cost of writing
and monitoring a number of short term contracts for the same position. Coase therefore
introduced the organizational capacities of a ¯rm as a production factor, distinguishable
from the technological capacities embodied in the ¯rm.
In order to determine the tradeo® between organizational and technological capacities,
parameters need to be designed to describe organizational capacities, for the Chief Executive
O±cer of a ¯rm controls the performance of the ¯rm by means of some of these organizational
parameters, rather than the ¯rm's technical parameters. For that aspect, Oliver Williamson
laid the foundations. In his seminal 1967 paper on the optimal size of a hierarchically struc-
tured ¯rm, Williamson determines, for a given technology, the optimal number of levels of the
¯rm's organization. The number of levels as the only organizational parameter to maximize
pro¯ts has been investigated further by, a.o., Keren and Levhari (1979, 1982). These models
are valid, however, for one speci¯c technology, i.e., the linear production function, for one
speci¯c wage structure, i.e., proportional to the level in the hierarchy, and for homogeneous
labor. These models are therefore too restricted to determine the relation and the tradeo®
between organizational and technological features, which is needed to describe the concept
of a cooperative ¯rm in a competitive environment. The model introduced by van den Brink
and Ruys (1996) removes these restrictions.
In this paper, the technology is described by a value-production function de¯ned on the
front-positions in the ¯rm that directly render services to the clients and, by being paid for
these services, create the value-added of the ¯rm. This function can be derived from a phys-
ical production function and is well suited for handling aggregate services. It is de¯ned as
the payo® function of a game on the set of front-positions. That function assigns a value1 to
various coalitions of front-positions, which coalitions represent teamwork or horizontal coop-
eration between the front-positions to enhance the value of their service for the client, such
as a surgical team. The higher levels in the organization of the ¯rm exist only to improve the
productivity of the front-positions, which describes vertical cooperation within the ¯rm. The
organization is a nexus of agency relations, represented by a directed graph with a unique
source or top-position. This top-down organization is called an implementation governance.
1Note that this value concept is adapted from cooperative game theory and is a real number representing,
e.g., an amount of money. The values (described here in the plural) that are associated with rules have a
completely di®erent meaning and have a sociological origin.
2The remuneration of each position in the organization is determined by a game that dis-
tributes the value-added of the ¯rm over all positions in the ¯rm. This model allows for a
general equilibrium approach, as has been shown by Ruys and van den Brink (1999). So the
essential components needed to describe the concept of a cooperative ¯rm in a competitive
environment, are (i) the value-production function describing the technology, (ii) the im-
plementation governance describing the organization of the ¯rm, and (iii) the remuneration
function allocating the value added over the positions within the ¯rm. For a given technology
and remuneration system, the top-position determines the governance in order to maximize
pro¯ts.
The concept of an implementation governance is rich enough to describe other organi-
zational parameters besides the number of levels. In his seminal work, Hofstede (1980), on
the basis of a large scale survey in more than 40 countries, identi¯ed some dimensions of
culture that characterize a society, viz. its governance structures. Four of these dimensions
are formally de¯ned here by restricting governance on a way that is speci¯c for each cultural
dimension. In van den Brink, Ruys and Semenov (1999) these cultural dimensions are related
to the distribution functions in the governance.
The same approach can be followed for describing the cooperative nature of a consumption
unit in a competitive environment. For that purpose the concept of a club is used. The club
concept is general enough to allow for a richer internal structure, and it has an established
place in the neoclassical literature. A club can be described as a voluntary group deriving
mutual bene¯ts from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members'
characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable bene¯ts (Cornes and Sandler, 1986).
In analogy to Coase's argument for the ¯rm, a club is formed if the transaction costs of
obtaining services outside the club are larger than the corresponding transaction costs inside
the club. This comparative advantage is assumed to be caused by the internal organization of
the club, which assumption constitutes the di®erence between our approach and traditional
club theory. Our clubs may have some own internal values and motives based on cooperation
that deviate from the values and motives in their outside, competitive world; they are not
completely values-transparent in their environment.
In analogy to the ¯rm, the internal governance of a club consists of a hierarchical organi-
zation, described by a directed graph. The di®erence is, however, that the authority within
a club is not allocated top-down, but bottom-up. In contrast to the ¯rm, the members of
the club constitute the highest authority; they delegate power to higher levels within the
organization. This type of organization is called a representation organization. The degree
of organization within a club depends on the value of interaction between users of a service,
called user-value. The user-value function is de¯ned as the payo® function of a game between
the members of the whole society. They can form all kinds of coalitions with each other, and
so increase their user-value, but at the cost of organizing each other within one or more clubs.
3So the user-value function is restricted by a graph representing the organization needed to
form coalitions. The result is the positional-budget function, a game that assigns budgets to
all positions within the club organization to optimally supply the members with the services
demanded. It will be shown that, for each user-value function, the number of levels of the
club-organization can be determined.
Ellickson et al. (1997) build on the Buchanan tradition in which many types of clubs
are possible and people may be a member of more than one club. They view the activity
of a club as a public project (see Mas-Colell, 1980) rather than as a provision of some level
of public good. A club membership is an opening in a club available to agents with spec-
i¯ed characteristics. Agents choose both private goods and club memberships, and private
goods and club memberships are treated and priced in parallel fashion. The Ellickson et al.
paper integrates club theory and general equilibrium theory, but their value-transparency
assumption prevents it from establishing a link between neoclassical and neo-institutional
economics.
This paper is organized as follows: The next two sections describe the optimal club orga-
nization needed to procure a common service. In Section 4 the optimal ¯rm organization
needed to produce a common service is presented. In Section 5, four cultural dimensions in
governance are described in terms of the club and the ¯rm concept, and for one of them the
e®ect on the outcome is shown. The last section concludes.
2 The segments of a common service
Cooperation means that people interact. This interaction has to be stripped to its essentials
for our purpose in order to make the idea operational. The concept of a common service is
therefore introduced in this section, which service is homogeneous in content for suppliers and
demanders, except for one dimension on which interaction between people is de¯ned. This
dimension may be interpreted as the real line on which people, the suppliers and demanders
of the common service, are located. The common service is thus homogeneous except for a
locational characteristic. The degree of aggregation needed to make a service homogeneous
determines the scope of the analysis, e.g., health care or dental care.
We focus ¯rstly on the service received. The procurement of a service by a group of
people in a society is organized by means of a set of clubs. The club members voluntarily
form a group deriving mutual bene¯ts from sharing a good that is characterized by excludable
bene¯ts. Tiebout (1956) introduced the idea of restricting the set of consumers that bene¯t
from a common service, which characterizes a local public good. A consumer may choose not
to enter the local public good if rivalry or harmful interaction diminishes her utility too much.
The net e®ect of internal interaction is bene¯cial for all involved. The Tiebout tradition has
focussed on clubs as political jurisdictions, allowing for a partition of the population as part
4of the basic description of the economy. Such a partition will result also in our approach.
A tradeable commodity is a carrier of some desirable property. An agent enters into an
exchange transaction with another agent if the commodity that the other agent owns carries
properties that she prefers over the properties carried by her commodity. The user-value of a
commodity is assumed to be independent from the seller of that commodity. The user-value of
the car you own is independent from the person who sold you the car. In the case of a service,
however, the relation between the provider (seller) and the receiver (buyer) becomes crucial.
The service rendered by a hairstylist involves the buyer personally, as does the services of
a medical doctor. So the provider of a service gets access to the receiver of the service in
order to provide the property desired by the receiver. A service is thus a relation between
the provider and the receiver, which relation carries over the desired property. The carrier
is the relation itself. When that relation is voluntary and anonymous, meaning that any
provider or receiver may be substituted in the relation by another (identi¯able) provider or
receiver, it is called a standard service. Nonstandard services are person-speci¯c services that
cannot be provided by standard economic transactions, such as cases in which the receiver
is vulnerable to the supplier. Hairstylist or medical services are usually standard services,
because these services are embedded in a legal framework that provides protection against
involuntary involvements.
Since a service is carried by a relation, we need to specify the location of the nodes of
this relation, i.e., the service provider and the service receiver. In this paper we assume
that the providers as well as the receivers are ordered linearly and are located on the line of
integers or on the real line. A service received is, for example, a (speci¯c) student receiving
a lesson from a (speci¯c) teacher, or a (speci¯c) patient receiving treatment from a (speci¯c)
medical doctor. The user-value of a service represents the net bene¯ts of this service for
a speci¯c receiver or user. Interaction between users may increase or decrease that value: a
student may learn more in a class of interacting students, or a patient may recover slower in a
room crowded with patients. The e®ects of this interaction are expressed by the user-value
function of a service, which is the payo® function of a game de¯ned on the set of all possible
coalitions of service receivers. This function implicitly de¯nes for each receiver of the service
a cardinal utility function for that service on the set of all coalitions of receivers, as well as
his willingness-to-pay for that service as a function of coalitions of receivers. This user-value
function is homogeneous if any service receiver can replace another service receiver in the
domain of the function without a®ecting the user-value2. That allows us to focus on the
e®ects of interaction between agents and on the spatial characteristics of agents, which are
relevant for the polity organization.
2So in the case of a homogeneous user-value function of a service, the service receivers are identical with
respect to their consumption abilities regarding this service, but not as members of a society in which a
consumers' organization is formed. Our approach is also suited for heterogeneous consumers, which however
complicates the results.
5The scope of interaction between the receivers of a standard service determines a hier-
archical structure in the service. The education service, e.g., may have several levels: the
student as individual receiver, the interacting students on the level of a class, the interacting
students on the level of the school, etcetera. On each level a speci¯c educational service
may be o®ered as a segment of the aggregated education service. This hierarchical structure
of the service partitions the set of students into subsets. If such a standard service can be
decomposed hierarchically in levels of aggregation of interacting users or receivers, is called
a common service. At each level, segments of that common service can be speci¯ed, where
a segment is determined by the size of the group interacting on that level3. In the case of a
homogeneous user-value function, the numbers of segments of a common service is equal to
the number of levels of aggregation. That determines the size of the club organization.
Since the receivers of a common service are paying for the service as well as for the organi-
zation, they determine together how many levels the club organization should have. That is
equivalent to saying: how many segments of the common service they want to identify and to
procure. The more segments are distinguished, the more delivery contracts have to be made
and the more sophisticated and costly club organization will be. The organization of a club
is characterised by a representation governance or a bottom-up organization. This is repre-
sented by a hierarchical graph consisting of a set of positions connected by principal-agent
relations, where the principal-positions on the lowest level are occupied by the members and
an agent-position on the top is occupied by the commissioner representing all the members.
The receivers of the common service are the members of the club, who delegate power and a
budget to one or more o±cer-positons, including the commissioner-position, just enough to
procure the segment of the common service for which that o±cer is appointed.
The tradeo® between the bene¯ts and costs for the service receivers of extra organization
is expressed by the budget-allocation function. Minimalization of this function determines the
number of levels of each club and, given the scope of interaction at each level, the number
of clubs. This structure is called the polity of the procurement of a common service. In
the case of individual procurement of a service, the polity has no organizational layer and
each member is formally his own club. Take a barber's service. When no regulation of the
market of haircutting services is required, this service has only one segment and its polity
is completely decentralized. But possible monitoring of this service or of its market would
require a higher segment that covers the whole market.
The demarcation line of (the segments of) a common service procured by a club is thus
determined by both its members' willingness-to-pay and the costs that are involved in con-
tracting transactions for the provision of each segment of the common service. When such
a segment is not tradeable on a market, in the case of market failures, transactions are per-
formed on a higher level segment. That requires a representation organization. The utilities
3This ordering of segments of a common service corresponds with the subsidiarity principle.
6form a good example. Since market failures have prevented `electricity from the switch' to be
treated as marketable commodity, it has been considered a service on a higher aggregation
level, procured by the local communalities and provided by a vertically integrated industry.
The same is true for `water from the tap'. Technological and organizational innovations have
made some of the segments of these services marketable. That has altered the demarcation
and the organization of the club procuring the common service of providing electricity to
households drastically.
3 The club organization
The main problem for a club that procures a common service is to valuate and to determine
the number of segments of this common service, i.e., the optimal degree of representation
organization, given the structure of interaction between the receivers of this service. That
problem is faced in this section.
A club is a voluntary group deriving mutual bene¯ts from procuring and sharing a com-
mon service characterized by excludable bene¯ts, by establishing an organization with a rep-
resentation governance that is empowered by the members to procure designated segments
of the common service. Examples of a club are: the legislative branch of the government
in a society, the policy making branch of a union, of an association, or of a cooperative, a
household, all as far as it concerns the collective decision making in that organization to
buy a common service, or to empower the executive branch of the organization to provide
it. For the government of a country, the spatial characteristic determining the segments of
a common service represents the territorial subdivision of the nation into states, provinces,
counties, cities, etcetera.
The governance is an organization represented by a directed graph of positions, which are
connected by principal-agent relations. In a representation governance the ultimate principals
are the members at the lowest level of delegation. Delegation and empowerment of agent-
positions, called o±cers, is organized bottom-up, with a unique agent-position at the top.
Each o±cer performs an agent for a group of principal-positions at a lower level, except for
the lowest level of positions, the members of the club, who have no principals. That group
of principals empowers the o±cer-position su±ciently to let it decide about the procurement
of the segment for which it is responsible4.
It is endogenously determined whether one or more clubs will procure a common service
for the members of the society. The set of clubs that provides the same common service
for the whole society is called the polity of that service. The decision about the number
of levels needed to provide optimally the common service is made by all members of the
society together, on the basis of the bene¯ts as determined by the user-value function, and
4In social choice theory this o±cer position is represented by the decision of the group itself. The agent-role
of the o±cer, executing the decision, is not relevant in that context
7the (transaction) cost resulting from the organization of clubs. This governance forms a
restriction on the user-value function, because the payo® for some member-coalition depends
now also on the costly contribution of the o±cer-positions in the club. That de¯nes a new
game on the set of possible coalitions of all positions in the club, with a payo®-function
assigning budgets to each o±cer-position. These budgets are needed to pay for the service
that is provided by the club to its members. Since these budgets are borne by the members,
the payo®-function of the extended game is called a budget-allocation function. The size
of a club is endogenously determined by minimalizing the burden for the members of the
society.
The homogeneity assumption of the user-value function implies that each club in the
polity has the same organization structure. So we can restrict the problem of determining the
optimal number of levels to the `representative' club5. Let there be, for example, 4 members
in the society. Then there are four di®erent polities possible with a span of users-interaction
varying from 1 to 4. The ¯rst polity is that each member has her own cooperation and is her
own o±cer and commissioner. Each of her decides for herself. There are two polities with a
span of users-interaction 2, as is depicted in Figure 1, one with a 1-level governance and one
with a 2-level governance. There is one polity with a span of users-interaction 4 and a 1-level
governance6. See Figure 1 for a one level and two level governance structure of a polity with
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Figure 1: A one- and a two-level polity with span of interaction 2 and m = 4
In Table 1 the three components of a club are summarized. They constitute the context
of the procurement of a common service by the members of a society.
The governance of a polity has been described as a directed graph of positions and of
5For reasons of simplicity we assume that, if there are m members in the society, k facilities of scope s,
then m = ks. This assumption is not essential for our results.
6In general, given ¯xed span of users-interaction s, one level governance makes it possible for the sets
fi0;1;:::;i0;sg, fi0;s+1;:::;i0;2sg, :::, fi0;m¡s+1;:::;i0;mg to coordinate decision making within these sets.
This requires the presence of level one coordinator positions L1 = fi1;1;:::;i1;m=sg. The governance structure
G1 is de¯ned conformly by G1(i1;k) = ; for k 2 f1;:::;m=sg, and G1(i0;(k¡1)s+1) = ::: = G1(i0;ks) = i1;k
for all k 2 f1;:::;m=sg. Expanding governance further yields governance levels Ln = fin;1;:::;in;m=sng with
maximal number of governance levels equal to nmax =
slog m and Lnmax = finmax;1g.
81. Members of a society, which is represented by a linearly ordered, ¯nite set N0, may
interact in using or consuming a common service. The value of this interaction is
expressed by the user-value function, w, of that common service, assigning to all
possible coalitions E ½ N0 of members the user-value of the common service. This
function is homogeneous with respect to the users of the common service.
2. In order to procure the common service, members form a structure of clubs with a
representation governance, which structure is called the polity of that common
service in the society. Each club determines the optimal number n of organizational
levels. A polity is a directed graph (Nn;Gn) with a set Nn of positions and a set Gn
of principal-agent relations that delegate power bottom-up. Each agent is controlled
by a group of principals of a uniform size s, called the scope of users-interaction.
A member in the set N0 ½ Nn is a principal that has no agent, which means that
the governance is empowered bottom-up. When there are n levels in a polity, there
exist k = m=sn clubs in the society, where m is the number of members in the society.
Each club with n levels has sn members and one commissioner. The other intermediate
positions are occupied by o±cers.
3. For each level n, the contributions and resources from the members are allocated ac-
cording to a budget-allocation function, bn. This function assigns a budget to each
position in the club in order to provide its o±cers with the means to procure the
corresponding segment of the common service.
Table 1: The three components of a club organization
agency relations, with each agent being controlled and empowered or ¯nanced by a group of
principals7 of a uniform size s. This number s is also called the scope of users-interaction
of the polity of a common service. In the case of a ¯rm the direction of control is reversed
and the `scope of control' means the number of agents controlled by one principal. Since
the burden-function expresses the cost and bene¯ts of interaction between receivers of var-
ious segments of a common service, it can also express di®erences in costs and bene¯ts as
determined by speci¯c cultural dimensions present in the society.
In the case that the budget-allocation function of a service leads to a polity structure
with one or more clubs, some partition of the linearly ordered set of members-positions, rep-
resenting the society, follows. Therefore, in the polity structure discussed here the members
have some speci¯c position and can no longer be treated anonymously, as was the case in the
user-value function. A particular member may be connected to some members and may not
be connected to other members8. For the examples illustrated in Figure 1 these partitions
are P1 = ffi0;1;i0;2g;fi0;3;i0;4gg and P2 = fN0g, while P0 = ffi0;1g;fi0;2g;fi0;3g;fi0;4gg.
7Solution of this type of problem requires the assistance of social choice theory.








fi0;(k¡1)sn+1;:::;i0;ksng, k 2 f1;:::;m=s
ng, i.e., P
n is the partition of N0 into maximally connected subsets
in Gn.
9The members of society with polity level n = 1 and partition P1 clearly cannot be treated
anonymous9. The budget-allocation function is assumed to be symmetric. Together with
homogeneity of the user-value function it follows that the same budget is assigned to all
positions within one level of the representation club. Therefore, we may say that a budget
is assigned to each level, instead of a budget being assigned to each position. So bn(k) is the
budget assigned to all positions in level k of a polity with n governance levels. The sum of
these budgets is a burden for each member at the zero level of a club. The user-value minus
the value needed for distributing budgets among the o±cer-positions in the club, is the net
user-value given by bn(0) of the budget-allocation function. Each (representative) member
wants to maximize this term over the set of feasible levels.
Example 3.1 In this example we use a speci¯c budget-allocation function that satis¯es stru-
tural monotonicity and symmetry. (This budget-allocation function is based on the concept
of a permission value as developed in a game theoretic context by Gilles, Owen, and van den
Brink (1992) and characterized in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997)).
The permission value distributes the dividend of each set of members E ½ N0 equally among
the members in E and all o±cer positions that serve these members, i.e., all o±cer positions
in the set b Gn(E) := fj 2 Nn j there exists a sequence of positions (h1;:::;ht) such that
h1 2 E; hk+1 2 Gn(hk) for all 1 ￿ k ￿ t ¡ 1 and ht = jg.
Consider a polity with m = 4 front positions N0 = fi0;1;i0;2;i0;3;i0;4g and span of in-
teraction s = 2. The two possible governance structures are illustrated in Figure 1 and the
`empty' structure in which there is no governance. If w(E) = jEj for all E ½ N0 (separable
user-value function with dividend equal to one for coalitions of size one, and dividend equal
to zero for all other coalitions) and using the permission value as budget-allocation function,
it follows that ¯n(0) = 1
n+1 which is decreasing in n, so n¤ = 0.
If w(N0) = jN0j, and w(E) = 0 if E 6= N0 (complementary user-value function with
dividend of the coalition of all members N0 equal to jN0j, and dividend of all other coalitions
equal to zero) then the permission value as budget-allocation function yields ¯n(0) =
jEj
jNnmaxj
if n = nmax, and ¯n(0) = 0 otherwise. So, n¤ = nmax =slogm = 2.
For an application of the permission value to the ¯rm we refer to van den Brink (1996),
van den Brink and Ruys (1996), and Ruys and van den Brink (1998). 2
The Example 3.1 shows how the optimal size of a representation organization is deter-
mined for two types of budget-allocation functions. From the homogeneity assumption of
9The budget-allocation function bn can be obtained from the user-value function w by means of the following
steps. First it is rede¯ned for a governance level n: vn(E) =
P
P2Pn w(E \ P), for all E ½ N0. Then it is
extended to all positions in the polity: ¹ vn(E) = vn(E \ N0), for all E ½ Nn. Finally, the budget-allocation
function bn:Nn ! R is de¯ned by the positional-value or the permission value, which is the Shapley value
restricted by a hierarchical graph.
10the user-value function it follows that each local optimization within a club is equivalent to
global optimization of the polity. In that case, group optimization for society can be reduced
to optimization in a club, where each (representative) member of a club wants to maximize
her net user-value of a common service over the set of feasible levels.
4 The ¯rm organization
The main problem for a ¯rm that provides a common service is to valuate and determine
the extent of the provision and the number of production levels to support this provision,
i.e., the optimal degree of an implementation organization, given the structure of productive
interaction between the providers of this service. That problem is faced in this section.
It has already been remarked already that the internal organization of the ¯rm is not con-
sidered in neoclassical economic theory. The ¯rm is simply an entity that transforms some
commodities into other commodities. In his seminal work Williamson (1967) investigated the
issue of an optimal size of a hierarchically organised ¯rm and introduced the internal orga-
nization of the ¯rm in economic analysis. Several authors, in particular Keren and Levhari
(1979, 1982) extended Williamson's work. Our approach to the ¯rm builds on this tradition,
but generalises it by allowing for di®erent production functions and remuneration systems.
We take authority relations into account but also other relations within the organization.
The second di®erence is that our approach is suited to immaterial services rather than
to material commodities. The production function is an appropriate tool to represent the
relation between quantitative inputs and outputs. This tool is less appropriate for the case
of services and for describing behavioral features of the individual agents concerned. The
concept of a common service has been introduced in the previous sections and generalizes
upon the commodity concept. Both a commodity and a common service may be the output
of the production process described in this section. However, we consider the input of labor
as a common service for the ¯rm, which ¯rm provides a particular common service to the
society. The technology of this ¯rm is described by a value-production function and expresses
the structure and the value of interaction between those laborers, called the service-providers
or the front-workers, that provides the particular service to the clients, the service-receivers.
The value-production function is de¯ned on the set of coalitions that the service-providers
may form.
Those coalitions of service-providers, however, can only be formed by an implementation
organization supporting those service-providers. The ¯rm is such an organization of roles
or positions (rather than of individuals) that implements the optimal production structure.
The description of this organization requires that the service-providers are linearly ordered.
Individual laborers employed on positions in the ¯rm that support the various segments
in the ¯rm are called coordinators. These positions are formed according to the partition
that cooperation between service-providers requires. The responsability for the whole ¯rm is
11carried by the coordinator-position at the top of the hierarchy, called the governor-position.
The governor may be a legal person. He empowers the ¯rm organization, is responsible for
the governance in the ¯rm and for its performance. If the ¯rm is a commercial ¯rm, he will
impose a pro¯t-maximizing culture on the ¯rm. In that case, the service will be marketable
and the external environment of the ¯rm consists of three competitive markets: the product
market, the labour market and the capital market. The prices formed on these markets are,
respectively, p, w and r. The three basic components of a ¯rm are summarized in Table 2.
1. Members of the labor force of a society who provide the common service, called the front-
workers, are collected in a linearly ordered, ¯nite set W. The production technology
determines how these front-workers cooperate and interact in producing or providing the
common service. The value of this interaction is expressed by the value-production
set of that common service. Each function in thie set assigns to all possible coalitions
E ½ W of front-workers the value-added of the common service, for the corresponding
number of levels. Each value-production function is homogeneous with respect to the
front-workers.
2. In order to provide the common service, a structure of ¯rms with an implementa-
tion governance is formed by the unique position in each ¯rm that empowers the
organization, called the governor. The structure of ¯rms is called the industry of
that common service in the society. Each governor determines the optimal number n
of organizational levels in the ¯rm. A ¯rm is a directed graph (Nn;Gn) with a set Nn
of positions and a set Gn of principal-agent relations that delegate power top-down.
Both depend on the size n of the ¯rm, which is the organizational parameter controlled
by the governor. Each principal in the ¯rm, called a coordinator, controls a group of
agents of a uniform size s, called the scope of providers-interaction. Coordinators
only serve to increase the productivity of the front-workers. The governor is the unique
principal-position in a ¯rm that empowers the organization, i.e., he provides the initial
resources needed for the ¯rm's operation and determines the size and the internal rules
and culture of the ¯rm by specifying the agency-relations of the organization.
3. The value added of the ¯rm is distributed among all positions in the ¯rm as positional
income according to the given remuneration function, to reward the initial resources
made available by the production factors. This function is a cooperative game restricted
by the governance and de¯ned on all positions of the ¯rm. It satis¯es properties that
re°ect the social or cultural values of society.
Table 2: The three components of a ¯rm organization
Since the governance structure has a tree structure, a level in the organization can be
de¯ned as the set of positions each of which has the same distance to the top-position10. Let
10Let L0 = N0 = fi0g represent the top-level with the governor-position of the ¯rm. Then L` = S
i2L`¡1 Gn(i), for ` = 1;:::;n, and N` = N`¡1 [ Ll. Additional structure is required to guarantee that
12n be the number of levels in a ¯rm. The set of positions Nn in that ¯rm can be partitioned
in level sets L0;:::;Ln, where L0 = fi0g is the highest level set with the governor as the
only member, the lowest level set Ln = Wn is the set of service-provider positions, and the
intermediate level sets L` for some ` = 1;:::;n ¡ 1, are the sets of coordinators at level `.
The number of service-provider positions, jWnj, is equal to sn in an n-level ¯rm11. So the
governor can completely determine the governance structure (Nn;Gn) of the ¯rm by choosing
the number of levels n of the ¯rm.
In Figure 2 the governance structure of a one-level and two-level ¯rm is given for the case






© © © © ¼































© © © © ¼
© © © © © ©
i2;1 i2;2 i2;3 i2;4
i1;1 i1;2
i0
Figure 2: A one- and a two-level ¯rm governance structure with span of interaction 2
For reasons of simplicity, we assume in this paper that the value-production function
is homogeneous with respect to the service-provider positions, meaning that all service-
provider positions in an n-level ¯rm are identical in the value-production process. Such
a value-production process can be described by a homogeneous value-production function
fn:f1;:::;jWnjg ! R de¯ned on the number of - identical - worker positions12.
The sequence of agency relations decentralizes decision making at each consecutive level
and allows the decrease of the complexity of the decision problem at each level. It results,
however, in certain level-dependent agency costs. These agency costs are stated as a percent-
age of ¯nal providers-value and are represented by 1 ¡ ®n, with the parameter ® between
zero and one. They therefore increase in the number of hierarchical levels. Examples of such
costs are the facilities needed for the coordinators to operate, resulting in a loss of output,
or costs involved in the processing and control of level-dependent budgets and information,
implying a loss of control of a coordinator over the behavior of his successors. Adding a level
the set of positions at level n, Ln, is equal to the set Wn of positions having no successor. This follows
from the assumption that each principal in the ¯rm has the same number of agents, the span of interaction
s. So jGn(i)j = s for all i 2 Mn = Nn n Wn. The positions at the `-th level of the ¯rm are member of
the set L` = N` n N`¡1 = fi`;1;:::;i`;s`g, for ` = 1;:::;n. The relational structure is then speci¯ed by
Gn(il;k) = fil+1;(k¡1)s+1;:::;il+1;ksg, for l = 0;:::;n ¡ 1 and k = 1;:::;s
l.









n ¡ 1)=(s ¡ 1).
12Alternatively, a heterogeneous providers-value process is represented by a value-production function
fWn:f0;1g
jWnj ! R. We will not consider that in this paper.
13in the organization may thus bene¯t the governor by increasing the scale of value-production,
at the cost of an increase in agency costs.
We assume the value-production function to be monotone in the sense that increasing
the set of workers does not decrease providers-value13. Since the span of interaction of the
¯rm is given, the only way to increase the number of service-provider positions is to increase
the number of levels in the ¯rm. An extra level has a positive e®ect on value added through
the value-production function. On the other hand, there is the negative e®ect of the level
dependent agency cost.
Note the following important di®erence in the governance of the club discussed in the
previous section and of the ¯rm discussed here. Since the ¯rm structure is expanded top-
down, the scope of value-production and the added value of the ¯rm depends on the number
of ¯rm levels. Since the polity structure is expanded bottom-up (implying that the set of
members is ¯xed for di®erent polity levels) the `user-value' in the polity is independent of
the number of polity levels. So, the user-value function is the same for all levels, while the
value-production function depends on the number of levels.
The output produced by the ¯rm is sold at a competitive output price p > 0. Thus, if
all service-provider positions are e®ectively occupied by labor resources, then a gross revenue
equal to pfn(sn) at an output price p > 0 is generated. The net revenue or the value
added is obtained by subtracting the level-dependent cost from this gross revenue14 yielding
p®nfn(sn). Note that the parameter ®, being the complement of the level-dependent agency
cost parameter, can be seen as an agency e±ciency parameter. It may correlate with the
span of interaction parameter s, but both are given here.
By de¯nition the value added of a ¯rm also equals the reward paid to the production
factors, i.e., the value added equals the sum of the positional wages and the positional returns
on capital. The remuneration system distributes the value added15 of a ¯rm.
This distribution function ' assigns a positional income to any position in the ¯rm. This
remuneration system determines the positional wages that are paid to the laborers occupying
the positions. The positional income allocated to position i 2 Nn in a ¯rm producing ac-
cording to fn is denoted by 'i(fn). Since we assume a homogeneous ¯rm with a symmetric
remuneration system we can speak about wages assigned to levels instead of wages assigned
to positions, i.e., for each level `, '`(fn) = 'i(fn) for i 2 L`. Similarly, the positional return
on capital of the governor position is denoted by '0(fn).
We impose two natural conditions on the form of the remuneration system, in addition
to the e±ciency condition mentioned earlier. Firstly, this function should satisfy structural
monotonicity, meaning that a supervisor does not receive a lower wage than his successors.
13A value-production function is monotone if E ½ F ½ Wn implies fn(jEj) ￿ fn(jFj).
14For notational convenience we do not consider material cost that depends on the level of providers-value.
Considering these costs to have given input price c > 0 does not change the results.
15In game theory this property is called e±ciency.
14Secondly, we assume it to be symmetric, meaning that in a homogeneous ¯rm it assigns the
same wage to all positions within one coordination or worker level.
For given size n the four components described above de¯ne an n-level ¯rm, denoted by
Fn = (Nn;Gn;;fn;'). Three of these components vary with the parameter n, the number of
levels. So a ¯rm is a function F that assigns to each number of levels the speci¯cation Fn
of components16. Since the pro¯t of a ¯rm depends on ¯rm size, the governor can determine
pro¯t by choosing the number of levels of the ¯rm. Increasing the size of the ¯rm can have
a positive and negative e®ect on the value added. The negative e®ect results from the level-
dependent agency cost as expressed by the parameter 1 ¡ ®n. The possible positive e®ect
results from the fact that more workers can be active. The governor of the ¯rm chooses n in
order to maximize pro¯t.
In the preceeding paragraph we described the internal organization of the ¯rm F. The
external organization of the ¯rm is represented by the reservation wage of workers, w > 0,
the reservation rate of return on capital of the governor, r > 0, and the price of a unit output,
p > 0. Not all ¯rm sizes are feasible, however.
In order for the ¯rm to be active the worker and coordinator positions have to be occu-
pied by employees. For the moment we assume the potential employees to have a positive
reservation wage w. They will accept a position in a ¯rm with n levels if and only if the
internal wages o®ered do not fall below their reservation wage w. A ¯rm can only produce if
the workers accept the internal wages o®ered to them. Similarly, the governor has a positive
reservation rate of return on capital r. If positional returns on capital for the optimal level of
the organization are lower than this reservation rate of return on capital, then the governor
will not activate the ¯rm, i.e., n = 0. Therefore, the governor chooses ¯rm size n such that
pro¯t is maximal under the constraint that the wages o®ered to the workers is at least equal
to their reservation wage w. If, at this level, the positional returns on capital are lower than
the reservation rate of return on capital r, then the ¯rm is not activated. So, in general, the
set of feasible ¯rm sizes N(w;r;p) can be empty or unbounded.
The optimal ¯rm level is the lowest level of the ¯rm that maximizes pro¯t under the
constraints that the wages assigned to service-provider positions are at least equal to the
reservation wage and the pro¯t of the governor position at least is equal to the reservation
rate of return on capital17.
Note that the optimal ¯rm level could be in¯nite, while the optimal polity level by de¯-
nition is ¯nite. The optimal ¯rm level is ¯nite if the set N(w;r;p) is bounded. The following
proposition shows that this holds if the value-production functions fn are such that average
productivity of the labor inputs is non-increasing in ¯rm size n, i.e. fn+1(sn+1) ￿ sfn(sn)
16In principle any parameter of the governance may be chosen.
17The function n:R
3
+ ! R de¯ned by n(w;r;p) = minfn 2 N(w;r;p) j '0(fn) = sup^ n2N(w;r;p) '0(f^ n)g and
n(w;r;p) = 0 if N(w;r;p) = ;, where N(w;r;p) is the set of feasible levels, assigns the optimal ¯rm level to
each triple of positive reservation prices.
15for all n 2 N.
Proposition 4.1 [van den Brink and Ruys (1996)]
Let a ¯rm F with average labor productivity non-increasing in ¯rm size be given. Then, for
any positive vector (w;r;p) of reservation prices, the set N(w;r;p) of feasible ¯rm levels is
bounded.
The above proposition shows that the optimal size of the ¯rm is ¯nite, even for some cases
of increasing returns. However, the existence of a positive optimal level is not guaranteed.
One of the reasons for non-existence is the fact that if we allow for di®erent value-production
technologies when the governor varies the number of levels, the set N(w;r;p) of feasible levels
may be empty.
5 Cultural dimensions in governance
In this section we introduce four cultural dimensions and describe them in terns of the
components of the club or of the ¯rm, as summarized in Table 1 an Table 2. Then we show
for one dimension, Individualism vs. Collectivism, that the cultural characteristics in°uence
the optimal outcome.
Clubs and ¯rms operate in an external environment that is represented by several param-
eters determining the internal performance of these organizations. The prices of marketable
goods are standard parameters in an market economy. New parameters are determined not
only by considerations of economic rationality but also by the speci¯c features of societies, in
particular their cultural characteristics. In addition, culture may a®ect the objective function
which is maximized in choosing the governance structures. In these two ways, the culture of
a society will in°uence the governance structures of organizations operating in this society.
In his seminal work, Hofstede (1980) identi¯ed and introduced some dimensions of culture
that characterize a society, viz. its governance structures. These characteristics have been
described intuitively. Our approach allows for a precise decription of these cultural dimen-
sions, although this precise description may exclude some intuitions that would otherwise be
admitted. In this paper we will not provide the precise de¯nitions for all dimensions, but
rather try to explain them in a non-technical way. We will be more speci¯c on one of these
dimensions.
Power distance refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of society accept
that power is distributed unequally. Large power distance, in particular, was found to be
associated with deeper organizational hierarchies in corresponding societies. It leads to larger
di®erences between agents at di®erent levels of a hierarchy in their language and way of
thinking, which makes their communication more di±cult. In addition, when power distance
is high, managers are reluctant to delegate decisions to the front workers, and the latter
expect superiors to give them detailed instructions and supervise them closely. These factors
16lead to a decrease of feasible span of interaction with increase of power distance; the span of
interaction can thus be used to measure power distance in the ¯rm.
We have assumed in Section 3 that under a speci¯c budget-allocation function, presumably
chosen by the members of the club, these members choose the organizational structure which
minimizes the di®erence between their burden and their budget. This is, of course, not the
only possible way of organizing the procurement of collective goods. Members of a society
may delegate to the top-position the power to determine the budget distribution system, or
the pattern of club organizations in the society, or both (of course, in many societies people
do not even get a chance to perform such a delegation, let alone to determine other aspects of
the governance system). A restriction is formed by the reservation values. So the governance
structure may re°ect the objectives of the top-position rather than of the front-positions. In
societies with higher power distance people will have a higher propensity for such type of
delegation (and have a higher acceptance of the fact that the agent at the top position, in
whatever way he arrived at it, determines the governance system). Thus, the relative role of
legislative and executive powers may be considered as an indicator of the power distance. A
large power distance will result in a deep governance, as compared to the governance formed
without this restrictions.
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which people feel threatened by uncertainty
and ambiguity and try to avoid these situations. People in societies with di®erent uncertainty
avoidance will di®er in the extent to which certainty and stability in their life is important for
them, and thus in the extent they are prepared to give up other goods in exchange for such a
certainty. For workers, in particular, the desire for stability in life will manifest itself in the
desire for a higher stability of income, that is, for a better job security. Workers may have
reservation levels of job security as elements of their participation constraint. In this case
governors will have little choice other `than to agree to these requirements. Alternatively,
taking such requirements into account is dictated by strong social norms or government reg-
ulations (and such norms and regulations would be caused by corresponing cultural factors);
the governors will have little choice in this case as well. Finally, the governors may discover
that satisfying such requirements leads to a greater loyalty and motivation of workers, which
increases workers' e®orts or allows the introduction of more e±cient technologies which re-
quire such an attitude from workers (such as diversi¯ed quality production in Germany and
'lean' production in Japan). Whatever the particular mechanism, in ¯rms where workers are
more uncertainty avoiding, the probability of dismissal of workers is likely to be lower; alter-
natively, the expected long-term wages will be higher. This is expresses by the remuneration
function.
Femininity-masculinity deals with a relative emphasis in society on achievement and suc-
cess on the one hand, and caring for others and quality of life on the other. One of the typical
characteristics of these societies is large-scale welfare systems { that is, comprehensive pub-
lic procurement of (private) goods like education, medical services and social safety nets.
17People are more inclined in feminine societies than masculine societies to view a common
service as multidimensional and complementary, which implies the necessity of their procure-
ment through a single club. The degree of masculinity/femininity in a club is determined by
the multi-dimensionality of procurement, representing a large degree of interaction. This is
expressed by the budget-allocation function.
Collectivism-individualism re°ects whether people look only after themselves and their
immediate family, or belong to 'in-groups' which 'look after them' in exchange for loyalty. In
some (individualist) societies people can entrust other people with organizing the procurement
of collective goods on the basis of a contract. In these societies there is no restriction on the
formation of clubs; collective goods can be provided via clubs, the members of which do
not have anything in common other than an interest in this particular collective good. In
other (collectivist) societies, the contract would be not enough: a trust relationship has to be
established before such a delegation. Such a relationship can be based on existing meaningful
association between people (family ties, common religion, race etc.) or have to be established
anew. The degree of trust necessary may di®er for di®erent purposes: sometimes a trust based
on common association is su±cient, but often additional investments in establishing trust are
necessary. As a result, in collectivist societies people prefer to organize the procurement
of collective goods, and of many private goods, within speci¯c groups of people who are
associated with each other in some way (besides having a common interest in a collective
good), e.g. through family ties, common religion, race, or working at the same enterprise.
We call these groups clans. There may be two types of clans: those in which members
trust each other for some exogenous reason (family, ethnicity etc.) and which are thus
given independently of the will of the members; and those, in which trust relationships are
established anew (e.g. 'family-like' enterprises). In either case the size of the clan will be
limited. For the ¯rst type of clan this is obvious; if the trust is established anew (the second
type of clan), for the most purposes there would be a limit on the size of a collective in
which trust can be e®ectively established and maintained. Thus, if a trust relationship has
to be established before delegation of decision-making rights in a club, it would place a
restriction on the set of clubs that could be formed (and in particular, on the maximum size
of a club). The more the propensity of people to require the establishing of such trust (the
more collectivist the society is), the stronger is such a restriction. This restriction will be
embedded in the user-value function. Thus, the strength of this restriction may serve as a
measure of the degree of collectivism.
After this general discussion on cultural dimensions we shall consider the collectivism vs.
individualism dimension in more detail to provide an example of formal analysis of di®erences
on cultural dimensions and of their e®ects on governance structures. We assume for simplicity
that the whole society is divided into clans of a ¯xed size, and it is impossible to form trust
relationships between members of di®erent clans. To simplify the presentation we restrict
18ourselves to comparing two polar cases of an individualist society (where the restriction is
not important) and a collectivist society (where it is absolute). Di®erent dimensions can
be measured through di®erent components of a club or ¯rm. As mentioned, the degree of
collectivism will be measured through the user-value function. In the previous section we
de¯ned the user-value function as a function that assigns to any coalition of members in a
society their user-value if they consume a service jointly. An alternative representation of
these user-values is to assign to any coalition of members the increase in user-value that was
not already obtained by subsets of this coalition. These values are given by the dividends
which for E ½ N0, recursively, are given by
¢w(E) = w(E), if jEj = 1
and




¢w(F), if jEj ¸ 2:
For a game theoretic discussion of these dividends we refer to Harsanyi (1959). The degree of
collectivism is now measured by clan size. If the clan size is given by nc 2 N then dividends of
all coalitions with size larger than clan size must be equal to zero. If, for example, clan size is
equal to one, then we have a linear user-value function given by w(E) = jEj for all E ½ N0.
If we use a budget-allocation function satisfying symmetry and structural monotonicity18
then in this case with separable user-value the optimal polity size equals n¤ = 0. Members
do not want to pay taxes to invest in a governance structure because governance cannot
improve their user-value, while it induces the cost of the coordinator positions. Advancing
this argument it follows that polity size is non-decreasing in clan size as is to be expected19.
Proposition 5.1 If the budget-allocation function satis¯es structural monotonicity and sym-
metry and clan size is equal to one then the optimal polity size is equal to zero.
The linear user-value function can be seen as an extreme case. The maximal clan size
is nc = jN0j, which yields no restriction on the user-value function. However, if we assume
that the dividends of all sizes smaller than this maximal clan size are zero, then we have
another extreme user-value function with complementary user-value in which all members
are necessary in order to generate a positive user-value. In this case the optimal polity size
n¤ = nmax, and thus the maximal number of governance levels will be formed, Sn¤ = jN0j.
This is the only structure that yields a positive user-value.
18Remember that by de¯nition we assume a budget-allocation function to distribute exactly the total value
added.
19With clan size increasing we mean that the dividends of coalitions with size not exceeding clan size stay
the same.
19Proposition 5.2 If the budget-allocation function satis¯es structural monotonicity and sym-
metry and the user-value function satis¯es w(N0) > 0, and w(E) = 0 if E 6= N0, then the
optimal polity size is equal to the maximal size nmax.
For intermediate cases (between linear and complementary user-value ) governance levels
between 0 and nmax can be possible. It is clear that the model can easily take account of
reservation values for the various positions.
The implications of collectivism to the ¯rm can be considered in a similar way, as has
been done in Example 3.1. In collectivist societies people prefer to have 'family-like' trust
relationships within a ¯rm, and are not satis¯ed simply with business-like relationships of
exchange of labour for wages. This may impose a restriction on the size of a ¯rm which
can be formed (alternatively, if trust relationships are not an absolute necessity but enhance
productivity, this may place a limit on the size of a ¯rm that can be e±cient); the impact of
such a restriction can serve as a measure of collectivism in a ¯rm.
6 Conclusion
In this paper a neo-institutional governance structure has been presented for the procurement
and the provision of a common service. The provision takes place in ¯rms with an imple-
mentation governance, forming the industry of that common service. The procurement is
organized by clubs with a representation governance, forming the polity of the common ser-
vice. Clubs empower ¯rms, as the legislative branch of a government empowers the executive
branch. An optimal governance for an industry and for a polity can be derived by maximizing
its objective functions, resulting in standard characteristics of a governance. Simultaneously
cultural dimensions of a society can be de¯ned precisely in terms of these governance char-
acteristics. We have shown that cultural values existing in a society in°uence governance.
This may lead to actual governance systems that deviate in some ways from the standard
governance. A government policy of changing the actual, culturally in°uenced governance
in the direction of the standard, optimal governance goes at a substantial cost, what we call
social transition costs. A policy of not imposing the standard governance, however, will cause
another type of cost, which may be called social transaction costs. The fundamental ques-
tions are whether, how fast and how far should a society aim at implementing the standard
governance. Or should the government guard the society's cultural identity and is the society
prepared to pay for it, given the associated social transaction cost? Although these questions
are not answered, tools are presented here which may contribute to formulating the questions
more precisely.
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